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NOTE
PUBLIC AID TO PAROCHIAL EDUCATION
IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
A parent's right to send his children to a parochial school, ' although
recognized as fundamental,2 does not entail a right to government
financial support of such schools.' Courts acknowledge that parochial
education benefits both students and society;4 courts nonetheless invali-
date any state program expressly designed to aid religious education.5
State legislatures-and less frequently the United States Congress-
continue, however, to enact programs permitting parochial schools,
their pupils, and supporters to obtain certain financial benefits avail-
able to public schools. Courts must then decide whether a particu-
lar program violates any constitutional restrictions on public aid to
religion.
I. For the purposes of this Note, a parochial school is a privately-owned nonprofit
elementary or secondary school that provides an education with some express religious
content. No distinction will be drawn between schools owned and controlled directly
by a particular church and those owned and controlled by a society of parents.
Privately-owned schools practicing racial discrimination are not included in this dis-
cussion, although they may otherwise meet the terms of the definition. See Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
3. See Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1968); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 816-17, 163
S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942) (en bane).
5. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963): "[TMo withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Schempp invalidated Bible
reading in a public school, but the quoted sentence now also applies to public aid to
parochial schools. See note 6 infra.
6. The United States Constitution imposes explicit, though somewhat contradictory
requirements: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. These requirements
also apply to the states. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Supreme Court has developed a
three-pait constitutional test for state programs that provide aid to parochial schools,
their pupils, or supporters: the program must have a secular legislative purpose; it must
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and it must not involve
excessive entanglement between the affairs of church and state. See, e.g., Lemon v.
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Unlike most states, Missouri has developed a body of state constitu-
tional law that virtually prohibits any aid to parochial schools in any
form. The 1974 Missouri supreme court decision in Paster v. Tussey,7
the capstone of this constitutional doctrine, erected an absolute
wall of separation between parochial schools and state aid. As inter-
preted in Paster, the Missouri constitution forbids any aid that directly
or indirectly benefits church related schools, regardless of the putative
recipient." Subsequent attempts to amend the Missouri constittition to
overrule Paster and to permit some state aid to parochial schools have
failed. 9 It is therefore appropriate to reassess the legal and constitu-
tional foundations of the existing Missouri doctrine.
This Note will undertake such a reassessment. Section I will outline
Missouri's constitutional limitations on aid to religious education and
discuss the Missouri supreme court's interpretation of these sections.
The conclusion is that Missouri courts have neither closely analyzed nor
correctly interpreted these provisions. The consequence is a rule
uniquely restrictive of state aid to parochial schools. Section HI will
analyze these restrictions in light of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution,10 and the equal protec-
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a discussion of the three-part test, see
Note, Establishment Clause Analysis Of Legislative And Administrative Aid To Reli-
gion, 74 COLutm. L. REv. 1175 (1974); text accompanying note 151 infra. An emerging
fourth test is that the aid must lack potential to foster political divisiveness along reli-
gious lines. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for Public
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). See generally Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution,
78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969); Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260 (1968); Duval, The Constitutionality Of State Aid To
Nonpublic Elementary And Secondary Schools, 1970 U. ILL. LF. 342; Freund, Public
Aid To Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969); Valente & Stenmeyer, Public
Aid To Parochial Schools-A Reply To Professor Freund, 59 Go. L.J. 59 (1970);
Wedlock & Jasper, Parochiaid and the First Amendment: Past, Present and Future, 2 J.
L. & EDuc. 377 (1973); Note, Parochial School Aid: A Public Perspective, 35 Orto
ST. LJ. 104 (1974).
Any state program aiding parochial schools must also satisfy the requirements of that
state's constitution which may be more restrictive than the first amendment. The pro-
visions of the Missouri constitution and their interpretation are the subject of this Note.
7. 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975), discussed in
notes 79-154 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 79-154 infra and accompanying text.
9. In the August, 1976, primary election, Missouri voters defeated an attempt to
amend the Missouri constitution to allow the state to provide transportation, auxiliary
services, and textbooks to students attending parochial schools. St. Louis Globe-Demo-
crat, Aug. 5, 1976, § A, at 13, col. 1.
10. "Congress shall make no law . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]
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tion clause of the fourteenth amendment." In both instances, the
conclusion is that the strict Missouri rule conflicts with these overriding
federal policies. Although federal courts have yet to accept this con-
clusion, they have not been confronted with a challenge to the strict
rule enunciated in Paster. A new challenge to the Paster rule based
on the United States Constitution might therefore succeed.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISSOURI RULE
A. The Constitutional Provisions
The Missouri constitution contains several provisions relevant to state
aid to parochial education. Article 1, section 6, of the constitution, a
part of the Missouri Bill of Rights, prohibits the state from compelling
any person to "support. . .any place or system of worship, or to main-
tain or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of any sect,
church, creed or denomination of religion."' 2 Section 7 prohibits taking
money from the public treasury, "directly or indirectly, in aid of any
church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any. . . teacher
thereof, as such. '' "a
Article IX of the constitution applies to education. Section 1(a)
requires the state legislature to establish and maintain free public
schools. 4 Section 5 requires that monies for the public schools be
"sacredly preserved as a public school fund the annual income of which
shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. See note 6 supra and notes 194-95 infra and accom-
panying text.
1I. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See note 6 supra and notes 192-
93 infra and accompanying text.
12. MO. CONST. art. I, § 6:
IN Jo person can be compelled to erect, support or attend any place or system
of worship, or to maintain or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher
of any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion; but if any person shall
voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall be held to the per-
formance of the same.
13, Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7:
IN o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly,
in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest,
pleachcr, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and . . . no preference shall be
given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of reli-
gion. or any form of religious faith or worship.
14. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a):
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preser-
vation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly shall es-
tablish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all
persons in this state. ...
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public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever."'1 This
section implicitly prohibits expenditures from the "public school fund"
to assist parochial schools, their supporters, or pupils.16 The most
sweeping injunction of aid to parochial education is article IX, section
8, which prohibits any body of state or local government, including
school districts, from appropriating or paying from "any public fund
whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian
purpose," or to help support any school "controlled by any religious
creed, church, or sectarian denomination whatever.' 17
These constitutional provisions do not per se outlaw all assistance to
parochial schools. The language of the Missouri constitution, although
more explicit than the first amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, is not necessarily more restrictive. Courts in other states have
construed similar constitutional language to allow state aid to church-
related schools when permitted by the first amendment.'3 Missouri
courts, however, have interpreted the language more narrowly.
B. The Court Interpretations
The Missouri supreme court in 1942 first discussed the issue of state
15. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 5:
The proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and
all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any
state fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands
and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, shall
be paid into the state treasury, and securely invested under the supervision of
the state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund the
annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and
maintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatever.
16. See Special Dist. for the Educ. & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler,
408 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927
(1953).
17. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (emphasis added). The complete section reads:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school dis-
trict or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay
from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church
or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or public
school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning
controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever;
nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be
made by the state, or any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation,
for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.
Id.
18. See, e.g., Board of Edue. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d
799 (1967), affd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See also cases cited note 143
infra.
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aid to parochial education in Harfst v. Hoegen.19 The school board of
a small Missouri town had incorporated a Catholic parish school into
the local public school district and maintained it with public funds.
After its inclusion in the public system, the parochial school used the
textbooks and course of study prescribed by the state Superintendent
of Schools. In all other respects, however, the school continued to
operate as a sectarian institution.2 0
The supreme court invalidated the town's practice on three grounds.
First, the court held that compelling children of every faith to attend
a parochial school,21 perhaps to participate in religious activities, denied
them religious freedom. 2  Second, the court found that use of public
funds to support a school still controlled by the Catholic church23
violated article IX, section 8.24 Finally, the court held that article I,
section 7, z5 prohibited employment of members of religious orders to
teach any courses in schools supported by public funds.2 6
19. 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942) (en bane).
20. Id. at 811, 163 S.W.2d at 610. The school retained the name St. Cecelia School,
priests and nuns continued to teach classes, the day opened with prayer, Mass was held
for all children in an adjacent church each morning before school, religious instruction
was included in the regular curriculum, and religious pictures and symbols were hung
in the classroom. Id. at 811-12, 163 S.W.2d at 610-11.
Apparently, not all Catholic parents wanted the school to be supported with public
funds, "Almost all of the persons engaged in this controversy are . . . Catholic." Id.
at 811, 163 S.W.2d at 610.
21. In addition to the incorporated parochial school servicing all Catholic children,
the school district maintained another school which only Protestant children attended.
Id. at 812, 163 S.W.2d at 611. It is unclear from the court's opinion whether children
were assigned to each school solely on the basis of religion. Nor did the court indicate
whether non-Catholic children were actually attending the parochial school at the time
of the suit.
22. Id. at 814, 163 S.W.2d at 612. The guarantee of religious freedom was in Mo.
CoNsr. art. II, § 5 (1875), now art. I, § 5, and in Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § 6 (1875),
now art. I, § 6, see note 12 supra.
The court found no significance in "[t]he fact that attendance at Mass is customarily
before school hours or that religious instruction may be given during recess periods or
that the participation of a non-Catholic child in these services may not be required."
349 Mo. at 814, 163 S.W.2d at 612-13.
23. The court characterized the school board's supervision as "nominal" and re-
jected the argument that the school board rather than a sectarian denomination con-
trolled the school. 349 Mo. at 815, 163 S.W.2d at 613. For an illustration of the ex-
tent of control that the church had over the incorporated school, see note 28 infra.
24. 349 Mo. at 814, 163 S.W.2d at 613. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
At the time of the decision, this provision was found in Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § 11 (1875).
25. See note 13 supra.
26. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 816, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942) (en bane).
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The practice 27 invalidated in Harfst was so obvious a violation of
The court held that the constitutional policy of the state, decreeing "absolute separation
of church and state," barred consideration of the teachers' full qualifications under state
standards and their "most unselfish and highest motives." Id.
Other states have sustained the employment of members of religious orders as teachers
in public schools. In Millard v. Board of Educ., 121 Ill. 297, 10 N.E. 669 (1887), the
court referred to teachers as "members" of the Catholic church and as "Catholic teach-
ers," but did not specify that they were members of a religious teaching order. No spe-
cific constitutional provision was mentioned. See also Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444,
267 N.W. 127 (1936) (employment of members of religious order to teach public school
does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting use of public school funds to support
sectarian school); Hysong v. School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894) (in absence
of sectarian teaching, employment of members of religious orders is within the discretion
of the school board and denial of such employment would deprive a person of public
employment because of his religious belief). But of. McDonald v. Parker, 130 Ky. 501,
110 S.W. 810 (1908) (uncompensated services as teachers in public school by teachers
from denominational college is not invalid, provided that no tax funds are thereby di-
verted to aid any parochial school).
27. Incorporating a parochial school into a public school system was not unusual
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Millard v. Board of Educ.,
121 II. 297, 10 N.E. 669 (1887); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d
256 (1940); Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918); Rawlings
v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956); McDonald v. Parker, 130 Ky. 501, 110 S.W. 810
(1908); Richter v. Cordes, 100 Mich. 278, 58 N.W. 1110 (1894); State ex rel. Public
School Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932); Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D.
444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936); Hysong v. School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894);
Domer v. School Dist., 137 Wis. 147, 118 N.W. 353 (1908).
These cases did not involve statutory provisions for statewide aid. Consequently, only
local practices, rather than programs applicable to an entire state, were adjudicated.
This type of "aid" to parochial schools may exist without challenge in some localities
even today.
A court may invalidate incorporation of a parochial school on two distinct grounds:
(1) that the incorporated school is a public school in which religious exercises are un-
constitutional, cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible read-
ing in public school violates first amendment); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(nondenominational prayer in public school violates first amendment); or (2) that the
school is a parochial school which may not receive any public support, see, e.g., Knowl-
ton v. Baumhover, supra (although court may not interfere with operation of parochial
school, it may enjoin appropriation of public funds for support or aid of such school);
State ex rel. Public School Dist. v. Taylor, supra (state superintendent need not recog-
nize school district as public and entitled to share in public school funds if only school
in district is parochial); Dorner v. School Dist., supra (school district may rent build-
ing owned by church for use as public school building, but may not maintain a parochial
school with public funds).
The'critical factors in determining whether a school is parochial, not public, are dis-
tinct sectarian religious instruction, State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, supra; Knowlton v.
Baumhover, supra; State ex rel. Public School Dist. v. Taylor, supra; Gerhardt v. Heid,
supra; Dorner v. School Dist., supra; see Millard v. Board of Educ., supra; Note, Catho-
lic Schools and Public Money, 50 YALE L.J. 917, 924 & n.49 (1941), and dominant con-
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church-state separation that lengthy analysis of the case is unwarranted. 28
Harfst is nonetheless important as the first Missouri supreme court
statement on the issue of public aid to parochial schools. The court
recognized the "great need of spiritual training" throughout the world,"9
acknowledged that many parochial schools are "great educational insti-
tutions" with "high standards of excellence," and recognized "that paro-
chial education is an embodiment of one of the highest ideals that men
may enjoy.""' Nevertheless, the validity of the incorporation practice
was purely a legal question,"' and the law was clear:
The constitutional policy of our State has decreed the absolute separation
of church and state, not only in governmental matters but in educational
ones as wxell. Public money, coming from taxpayers of every denomina-
tion, may not be used for the help of any religious sect in education
trol by officials of the church, see State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 186, 172 A.
835, 837 (1934); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, supra at 372-73, 28 N.E.2d at 266-
67; Knowlton v. Baumhover, supra at 696-98, 166 N.W. at 204; cf. Richter v. Cordes,
supia. "The word 'control' has no legal or technical meaning distinct from that given
in it,, popular acceptation." Gerhardt v. Heid, supra at 457, 267 N.W. at 134, citing
13 C.J. 837 (1917). For examples of the degree of control commonly exercised by
church officials, see note 28 infra.
28. Eleven years after Harfst, the court faced a similar problem in Berghorn v. Re-
organized School Dist., 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953). Again the issue was
whether public funds could be used to support nominally public schools operated by a
church. The court held that the schools were parochial because of the control exercised
by the Caitholic church.
Several factors convinced the court that the schools were not controlled by the public
school board. After the schools were inducted into the public school system, they were
"operated by the Roman Catholic Church as. . . parochial schools under and in accord
with the Roman Catholic Church laws and policies." If church and school board issued
conflicting orders, the teachers were obligated by their religious oaths to ignore the secu-
lar authorities in favor of the church authorities. Title to the school buildings remained
in the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 133, 260 S.W.2d at 578-79. Other persuasive
faclor were the religious garb and emblems of teachers, daily religious services for the
students in churches located on the same property as the schools, religious instruction
of pupils on Saturday mornings by the same teachers who taught regularly in the schools,
assignment of non-Catholic children to different schools, church canons requiring Catho-
lic children to be educated in schools in which religion is the most important element,
and recess of school for religious as well as legal holidays. Id. at 139-40, 260 S.W.2d
at 583-84.
The supreme court held that Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, art. I, § 6, and art. IX, § 8,
invalidated the payment of public funds to support the schools. The court did not reach
the allegation that public support of the schools violated the due process clause, Mo.
CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
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or otherwise. If the management of this school were approved, we
might next have some other church gaining control of a school board
and have its pastors and teachers introduced to teach its sectarian
religion. Our schools would soon become the centers of local political
battles which would be dangerous to the peace of society where there
must be equal religious rights to all and special religious privileges to
none.
3 2
In Harfst, the court decreed absolute separation of church and state
in the context of virtually complete integration of church and state.
The school board rendered direct aid to the church as an institution;8
the church participated directly in government affairs through its
relationship with the school board. A decree of absolute separation
was unnecessary to resolve the case, and might properly be considered
dictum. Subsequent reliance on this dictum, when the church-govern-
ment relationship was less direct, led to extension of the Harfst result
well beyond its legal rationale.3 4  Moreover, the Harfst court evidently
feared political division along religious lines if public funds were ex-
pended in support of one particular religion."3 When aid would not
promote such political strife, the policy rationale of Harist would not
support extension of its sweeping language.
Eleven years after Harfst, in McVey v. Hawkins,", the Missouri
supreme court held that article IX, section 5, of the Missouri constitu-
tion3 7 prohibits public school districts from using the "public school
fund" to transport parochial school children to class.33 In McVey,
a local school board had used public school buses to transport
32. Id.
33. See notes 20-23, 28 supra.
34. See Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1111 (1975), discussed in notes 79-154 infra and accompanying text; Special District
for the Educ. & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60, 63-65
(Mo. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 50-55, 258 S.W.2d 927, 930-31 (1953).
Although the court in Special District and McVey did not use the phrase "absolute sep-
aration of church and state," the doctrine undoubtedly influenced the results. See also
40 Mo. L. REv. 342, 344 & n.20 (1975).
35. 349 Mo. at 817, 163 S.W.2d at 614:
If the management of this school were approved, we might next have some
other church gaining control of a school board and have its pastor and teachers
introduced to teach its sectarian religion. Our schools would soon become the
centers of local political battles which would be dangerous to the peace of soci-
ety .....
36. 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953).
37. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
38. 364 Mo. at 561 258 S.W.2d at 933-34,
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children part way to a parochial school located in another school
district.39 The school board claimed express authorization to trans-
port the children under a statute permitting school districts to pro-
vide free transportation for pupils of all nonprofit schools in the dis-
trict." The board also contended that it was not spending public funds
for transportation of parochial school children because the district
incurred no additional expenses under the busing plan. 41 Finally, rely-
ing on Everson v. Board of Education,42 the board argued that transpor-
tation of parochial school children was "valid and constitutional as a
lawful exercise of the police power of the state."43
39. Id. at 47-48, 258 S.W.2d at 927-28.
40. See Law of May 15, 1939, § 9197, 1939 Mo. Laws, at 719; id. § 16a, at 720:
When any school district makes provision for transporting any or all of the
pupils of such district to a central school or schools within the district, and
the method of transporting is approved by the state superintendent of schools,
the amount paid for the transportation .. . shall be a part of the minimum
guarantee of such school district for the ensuing year . . . and provided fur-
ther, that for the transportation of pupils attending private schools, between the
ages of six and twenty years, where no tuition shall be payable, the costs of
transporting said pupils attending private schools shall be paid as herein pro-
vided for the transportation of pupils to public schools.
41. 364 Mo. at 51-52, 258 S.W.2d at 930-31. The school board based this argument
on the statutory provision for additional funds to school districts only for pupils actually
delivered to schools within that district. Since the parochial school to which the pupils
were delivered was located outside the district involved in the case, that district had not
received any funds under § 16a, see note 40 supra, for transporting parochial school chil-
dren. The trial court had accepted this argument.
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the United States Supreme Court sustained a
New Jersey statute that appropriated state funds to reimburse the parents of parochial
school children, as well as the parents of public school children, for the costs of trans-
porting their children to and from school. The Court found that this expenditure was
for the valid public purpose of having children ride public buses rather than "run the
risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or 'hitchhiking."' Id. at 6-7.
Therefore the legislation did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. The Court also stated that, although the reimbursement approached the
"verge" of unconstitutionality, id. at 16, it did not breach the "high and impregnable"
wall of separation between the affairs of church and state and thus did not violate the
first amendment. Id. at 18.
43. 364 Mo. at 55, 258 S.W.2d at 933. Since Everson, numerous states have adopted
similar programs to provide transportation to children attending parochial schools. In
1973, 27 states provided some form of publicly-financed transportation to pupils in all
schools. Luetkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376, 381 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd mem.,
419 U.S. 888 (1974).
The variety of state constitutional provisions on church-state relations has spawned
a considerable amount of litigation over these transportation programs. Some states
have held that free transportation of all pupils is valid even under restrictive provisions
of state constitutions because it benefits the children rather than the parochial schools.
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The court rejected all of the board's arguments by focusing on the
purpose of the expenditure. Because the incidental fund from which
the district paid the transportation expenses was partially derived from
See, e.g., Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Adams v. County
Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (1942); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314,
199 A. 628 (1938); Everson v. Board of Educ., 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (Ct. Err.
&App. 1945), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Other states have sustained state-financed transportation of all pupils because it pro-
tects the health and safety of all children who attend school. See, e.g., Bowker v. Baker,
supra; Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed,
365 U.S. 299 (1961); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945); Board
of Educ. v. Wheat, supra; Americans United Inc. as Protestants & Other Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State v. Independent School Dist., 288 Minn. 196, 179
N.W.2d 146 (1970); Rhoades v. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 846, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 11 (1967).
Another common basis for sustaining equal transportation benefits is that they pro-
mote compliance with compulsory school attendance laws. See, e.g., Bowker v. Baker,
supra; Adams v. County Comm'rs, supra; Board of Educ. v. Wheat, supra; Everson v.
Board of Educ., supra. Cf. School Dist. v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58, 70
(1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting):
The children of today are the citizens of tomorrow. Many of the bare-kneed
tots who wait for a lift along the dusty margins of a country road will one
day be manning the Ship of State. Whether they will be qualified to handle
the ship of America's destiny in calm and in stormy waters will depend to a
great extent on the training they receive in their formative years. The empha-
sis, therefore, should be on amplifying rather than restricting the means which
will permit the children to obtain as much schooling as possible.
Other states, however, have held that publicly-financed transportation of parochial pu-
pils violates state constitutional provisions. Sometimes constitutional provisions that
prohibit any state aid to parochial schools, directly or indirectly, are the impediment.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 6 W.W. Harr. 181, 172 A. 835 (Del. 1934);
Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941); Visser v. Nooksack Valley
School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 708-09, 207 P.2d 198, 203 (1949); Judd v. Board of
Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 211, 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938). Other courts have held that
transportation of public school pupils is valid only as an incident to the state's duty to
provide public schools. See Gurney v. Ferguson, supra; Mitchell v. Consolidated School
Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 68, 135 P.2d 79, 82 (1943); Tockman, The Constitutionality of
Furnishing Publicly Financed Transportation to Private and Parochial School Students
in Missouri, 1963 WASH. U.LQ. 455, 467-68, 505; cf. School Dist. v. Houghton, 387
Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956); State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192
N.W. 392 (1923). Under this theory transportation of parochial school students is un-
constitutional because tax revenues may not be appropriated for private purposes. Car-
michael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 514 (1937); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S.
233, 238 (1920); Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710, 717
(1910). See also Mo. CONST. art. X, § 3. A third group of courts, while agreeing that
such transportation is beneficial because it promotes the safety and welfare of the chil-
dren attending school, have outlawed transportation of parochial school pupils because
it incidentally aids the parochial schools. See, e.g., Spears v. Honda, 51 Hawaii 1, 12,
449 P.2d 130, 137 (1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 396, 488 P.2d 860, 866
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the state public school fund,44 the constitution required its use solely
to establish and maintain free public schools. The court reasoned that
"the public school funds used to transport the pupils part way to and
from the [parochial school] . . .are not used for the purpose of main-
taining free public schools . . . . , The board's argument that such
services involved no additional cost was irrelevant;46 the question was
the purpose of the money actually being spent. The court noted that
[o]ne could equally contend that, since the board had equally author-
ized the transportation of parochial school children, the entire cost of
the transportation was for their benefit and that the public school chil-
dren were being transported at no additional expense to the district.4 7
The court also rejected as irrelevant the school board's other two argu-
ments. The state legislature obviously could not authorize a breach of
the state constitution; 48 Everson considered the extent of state police
power under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, not
the permissible uses of Missouri's public school fund.49
The validity of the court's decision depends on the applicability of
article IX, section 5, to the transportation expenditures involved; only
the "public school fund" must be spent solely to establish and maintain
the free public schools.0 The Missouri constitution defines the "public
school fund" as:
(1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Judd v. Board of Educ., supra at 214, 15
N.E.2d at 584; Mitchell v. Consolidated School District, supra. See generally Annot.,
41 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972).
44. Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 5.
45. 364 Mo. at 56, 258 S.W.2d at 933-34.
46. Id. at 54, 258 S.W.2d at 932-33.
47. Id. at 54, 258 S.W.2d at 933.
48. See id. Because the school board relied on the statute as a defense, the court
felt obliged to question its constitutionality. Id. at 52, 258 S.W.2d at 931. The
opinion makes clear, however, that the board's major argument was that transport-
ing the parochial school children did not cost the district any additional money.
Had the board intended to rely primarily on the statute, it would not also have argued
that it had received no reimbursement under the statute for transporting parochial school
children. The trial court had declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute "on
the ground that no matter connected with said section was directly involved .... " 364
Mo. at 51, 258 S.W.2d at 930.
49. Id. at 55, 258 S.W.2d at 933.
50. Mo. CoNsr. art. IX, § 5. Even this conclusion is not automatically true, be-
cause the only funds explicitly limited to the exclusive support of public schools are the
income from the "public school fund."
The court frequently referred to the language in the section directing that income of
the "public school fund" "be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free
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all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and all monies,
bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state
fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands
and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat.
51
The McVey court assumed that the transportation funds were part of
this public school fund. In fact, these funds came from the local dis-
trict's "incidental fund," only a portion of which was derived from the
state public school fund.52 Article IX, section 5, imposes constitutional
restrictions only on the state public school fund, without mentioning
local incidental funds. The court nonetheless assumed that the con-
stitutional limitation applied to all local funds; the court characterized
the "essential question!' as "whether the use of the public school
public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatever." See 364 Mo. at 53, 55,
56, 258 S.W.2d at 932-34. These references to the language of § 5 would indicate
that the court based its decision solely on a violation of § 5, although the court's ultimate
holding was that the transportation of parochial school students was "unlawful" and not
that it was "unconstitutional." Id. at 56, 258 S.W.2d at 934.
Even if the funds for equal transportation benefits may not be channeled through pub-
lic schools, the state might create a public agency that would provide bus transportation
for pupils of all schools. See La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks,
Transportation and Medical Care, 13 J. PuB. L. 76, 86 (1964) (footnotes omitted):
In short, state provision of bus transportation can properly be limited to public
school children if the administration is part of the public school administrative
system. But if school transportation becomes a general state or municipal wel-
fare measure administered by regular government agents, the services must be
available to children attending all schools. This rationale leaves the problem
of exclusion of bus transportation benefits up to a legislative intent.
If the Missouri General Assembly does enact legislation authorizing public expendi-
tures for transporting parochial school pupils, any challenge to the legislation would
probably be brought under Mo. CONsr. art. IX, § 8. In Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App.
2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946), the California court of appeals construed a provision
of the California constitution, now CAL. CONsT. art. XITI, § 24, that is virtually identical
to Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8, to permit state-financed transportation of parochial school
pupils. The court found that the transportation benefitted the children rather than the
parochial school, protected the health and safety of all children that attend school, and
promoted compliance with the state's compulsory attendance law. See also Board of
Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973). If the Missouri court were
to invalidate such legislation, the decision would reflect a difference in judicial attitudes
rather than a necessary interpretation of a constitutional provision.
51. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
52. 364 Mo. at 58, 258 S.W.2d at 932. The "incidental fund" from which school
districts were to pay all bus transportation costs was derived in part from local taxation,
collected and paid to the district, and in part from state aid under § 16a, see note 40
supra, "apportioned from the appropriation of state moneys raised by taxation aug-
mented by accrued income derived from the State Public School Fund." 364 Mo. at
51, 258 S.W.2d at 930.
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monies, to wit, the incidental funds of the district, for defraying the
expenses of transporting the parochial school children. . is a use for
the purpose" mandated in section 5.53 Nowhere did the court justify
this equation of local "incidental funds" with the state "public school
fund" named in the constitution. Of course, this fund might mean all
public expenditures for education. Perhaps proper accounting tech-
niques would require a pro rata share of the transportation funds to be
deemed expended from the public school fund. McVey should have
addressed these questions directly. The court's failure to do so means
that the decision rests on an unproven premise.
McVey's failure to define "public school fund" has also allowed sub-
sequent decisions to expand the strictures of article IX, section 5, to all
public funds.5 4 McVey holds that those monies in the public school
fund cannot be used to assist parochial school children. The equation
of "public school fund" with all public funds allowed the Paster court
to significantly expand the McVey rule: "In McVey . . . this court
held that transportation of parochial school pupils was an expenditure
of public school funds for other than [constitutional purposes]." 55 This
language strongly hints that any transportation of such pupils at public
expense is unconstitutional, a result broader than McVey requires.
Finally, McVey involved a continuing expenditure of public funds,
and did not address an expenditure originally made for public
school purposes and later used for a purpose arguably forbidden by
article IX, section 5. If, for example, a school district bought a bus,
used it for ten years, and then gave it to a parochial school, it is uncer-
tain whether McVey would ban such a gift. McVey does not make
clear, therefore, whether the uses of property purchased with section
5 funds must always conform to the purposes of the section. If article
IX, section 5, controls the disposition of school property as well as the
use of state funds, the power of local school districts efficiently to dis-
pose of their used property may be illogically limited.
The church-state issue next arose in Missouri in the context of public-
ly supported auxiliary services for parochial school students. During the
1963-64 school year, the St. Louis County Special District for the Edu-
53. 364 Mo. at 53, 258 S.W.2d at 932.
54. See Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1111 (1975); Special Dist. for the Educ. & Training of Handicapped Children v.
Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. 1966).
55. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111
(1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 79-154 infra.
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cation and Training of Handicapped Children sent its speech therapists
into county parochial schools to provide speech services directly to
parochial students. The State Board of Education refused to reimburse
the Special District for its expenses in providing these services. The
Special District then sued the Commissioner of Education. The trial
court denied relief and the District appealed. In Special District for
the Education & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler,6 the
Missouri supreme court held, without discussion, that providing speech
therapy to pupils in parochial schools does not support or maintain
free public schools, and that the use of "public school funds" for that
service was invalid under article IX, section 5, of the Missouri consti-
tution.57
State-funded therapy programs of the kind invalidated in Special
District were subsequently held to violate the establishment clause of
the first amendment. In Meek v. Pittenger,s a 1975 case, the United
States Supreme Court held that state-funded auxiliary services in
parochial schools are constitutionally impermissible."9 The Court had
56. 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
57. Id. at 63. The court also cited Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 3(b), which provides:
In the event the public school fund provided and set apart by law for the
support of free public schools, shall be insufficient to sustain free schools at
least eight months in every year in each school district of the state, the general
assembly may provide for such deficiency; but in no case shall there be set
apart less than twenty-five percent of the state revenue, exclusive of interest
and sinking fund, to be applied annually to the support of the free public
schools.
The court apparently held that appropriations made by the general assembly under arti-
cle IX, § 3, to provide for the deficiency in the "public school fund" become part of
that fund and may be used only to establish and maintain free public schools. By "pub.
lic school fund," therefore, the court apparently meant the supplemental state funds ap-
propriated under § 3(b) "for public school purposes" in addition to the "public school
fund" established by article IX, § 5.
58. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
59. Id. at 369-72. Auxiliary services generally consist of speech therapy, remedial
mathematics and reading instruction, psychological testing and diagnostic services, adap-
tive or corrective instruction in physical education, welfare and health services, and guid-
ance and counseling. The services are designed to improve a handicapped child's ability
to learn in a regular manner.
One state court had held that because auxiliary services are "attuned to the needs of
the physically, emotionally, and culturally handicapped children," they are not subject
to the same objections made against providing teachers for regular subjects "in an infor-
mal day-to-day teaching situation." Protestants & Other Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79, 87, 275 N.E.2d 603, 607-08 (1971). The
Supreme Court in Meek disagreed. According to the Court,
[t]he likelihood of inadvertent fostering of religion may be less in a remedial
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already held, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,6" that the state "must be certain
. . . that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion .... ""-' The
supervision necessary to ensure that such teachers did not "advance the
religious mission of the church-related schools in which they serve"
would entail a constitutionally impermissible entanglement between
church and state." Hence, the auxiliary services could not be provided
in a constitutionally acceptable manner.
arithmetic class than in a medieval history seminar, but a diminished probabil-
itv is not sufficient ....
421 U.S. at 370-71.
60. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970).
61. 403 U.S. at 619-20.
62. 421 U.S. at 370. The excessive entanglement test is based on Walz v. Tax
Comm'n. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970): "We must also be sure that the end result-the
effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with religion." The excessive en-
tanglement factor was adopted by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
( 1971), as a separate test of an unconstitutional method of aiding religion and parochial
schools. Although the test was stated originally in terms of an effect, a potential effect
is now apparently sufficient to invalidate the aid.
The Court's analysis appears to follow a warped syllogism: Is there anything in the
aid program which, under any circumstances, might potentially foster religion? If so,
the state must engage in constant surveillance of the procedure to ensure that state funds
do not promote religion. The constant surveillance, however, constitutes excessive en-
tanglement between church and state. Thus, any aid program with any potential, how-
e'er miniscule, for promoting religion is unconstitutional.
The fallacy in this logic is that a negative answer to the initial question is impos-
sible. "Certainty is an impossible standard to meet . . . ." The Supreme Court, 1974
Temi, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 108 (1975). In Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney
Gcneral (In re Proposal C), 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971), the Michigan su-
preme couit applied a more realistic test-a rule of "reasonable likelihood" to determine
Nhcthei sending public employees into parochial schools would foster religion or create
excessive church-state entanglement. The court held such a procedure constitutional be-
cause "the possibility of excessive involvement in religious affairs is, of course, at most,
minimal." Id. at 420, 185 N.W.2d at 22.
In Mek, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting on the auxiliary services issue, asserted that
the Court's holding "literally turns the Religion Clauses on their heads." 421 U.S. at
387. He thought the decision would force parents, other than the affluent, "to make
a choice between . . . their children's spiritual needs and their temporal need for special
remedial learning assistance," and that such a result is a "denial of equal protection to
children in church-sponsored schools .... ." Id.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting on auxiliary services, castigated the majority for finding
excessive entanglement without relying on any established facts:
The burden of proof ordinarily rests upon the plaintiff, but the Court's conclu-
sion that the dangers presented by a state-subsidized guidance counselor are the
same as those presented by a state-subsidized chemistry teacher is apparently
no more than an ex cathedra pronouncement on the part of the Court, if one
may use that term in a case such as this, since the District Court found the
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After Special District and prior to Meek, it was unclear if the
Missouri constitution would allow the state to spend money not derived
from the "public school fund" for auxiliary services in parochial schools.
The question is now moot. Whether Missouri may constitutionally pro-
vide auxiliary services to parochial school pupils in places other than
the parochial school is unresolved. A logical, and possibly economical,
alternative would be provision of such services to all students, public
and parochial, at a single public school. The Supreme Court hinted
in Meek that such a solution would not offend the first amendment.03
After the state Commissioner of Education refused to reimburse the
Special District for services provided in the parochial schools, the Spe-
cial District altered its program, permitting parochial students to spend
part of the school day at District buildings receiving speech therapy. This
program would presumably satisfy the fiist amendment as construed in
Meek. In the second part of Special District, however, the Missouri su-
preme court held that this practice violated the state's compulsory atten-
dance law. Consequently, the District was not entitled to reimbursement
for its expenses. Missouri's compulsory attendance law requires every
child between the ages of seven and sixteen to "attend regularly some
day school.'64  The school day is elsewhere defined as six hours of
facts to be exactly the opposite-after consideration of stipulations of fact and
an evidentiary hearing ....
421 U.S. at 391-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting). The Court considered
two other types of aid in Meek. The Court sustained a statutory provision for loaning
secular textbooks to students in parochial schools because the relevant Pennsylvania
statute was
in every material respect identical to the loan approved in [Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)]. Pennsylvania, like New York, "merely
makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school
books free of charge."
421 U.S. at 362.
The Court invalidated a statute that provided for the free loan of instructional mate-
rials and equipment directly to qualifying nonpublic schools because it had "the unconsti-
tutional primary effect of advancing the religious character of the schools benefiting
from the Act." Id. at 363.
63. The Court said that it did "not question. . . the authority of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly to make free auxiliary services available to all students in the Com-
monwealth, including those who attend church-related schools." 421 U.S. at 368 n.17.
See Rabinove, Does "Dual Enrollment" Violate the First Amendment?, 3 J. L. & EDuC.
129 (1974). But cf. Thomas v. Schmidt, 397 F. Supp. 203 (D.R.I. 1975); Americans'
United for Separation of Church & State v. Paire, 359 F. Supp. 505, 510-11 (D.N.H.
1973); Fisher v. Clackamous County School Dist., 13 Ore. App. 56, 507 P.2d 839
(1973).
64, Mo, REV. STAT, & 167,031 (1969).
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teaching.6" Although the purpose of compulsory attendance laws is to
assure that children receive a minimum amount of education,"6 the
court in Special District believed that these statutes unambiguously
required the children to attend one and only one school for the allotted
six hours.67  The court declared that the involvement of parochial
school pupils was "incidental" to its decision, 8 but the dissent noted
several instances in which a similar application of the legislation would
produce anomalous results if only public school pupils were involved.69
The inference is that provision of services to parochial school students
was the real target of the court's ruling.
There are three means to avoid the court's peculiar construction of
the compulsory attendance law. The 'statute expressly provides that a
"mentally or physically incapacitated" child need not attend school for
the full time otherwise required. 7°  Handicapped students could thus
attend a parochial school for less than six hours per day while receiv-
ing therapy at a public school during the rest of the day.71 A child
65. Mo. REv. STAT. § 160.041 (1969).
66. Morton v. Board of Educ., 69 Il. App. 2d 38, 45, 216 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1966);
accord, Special Dist. for the Educ. & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408
S.W.2d 60, 67 (Mo. 1966) (Finch, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. 408 S.W.2d at 64. The court stated:
We are asked to change the statutory requirement to read "some day schools"
or to read "some day school or schools." We cannot do this. We find no
ambiguity which would permit us to judicially ascertain the legislative intent.
We must apply the statute as written.
Id. at 63.
68. id. at 64.
69. Judge Finch, dissenting, argued that, under the majority's interpretation of the
statute, a family would violate the compulsory attendance statute if it moved from one
community to another during the school year, or transferred a child from one school
to another in the same district to relieve overcrowding or to utilize special facilities. Id.
at 66. (Finch, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority's interpretation would also
require a ruling that releasing students from school for a certain period each day in order
to take advanced courses in a junior college would violate the statute. Id.
70. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031 (1969):
(1) A child who, to the satisfaction of the superintendent of schools of the
district in which he resides, or if there is no superintendent then the chief
school officer, is determined to be mentally or physically incapacitated may be
excused from attendance at school for the full time required, or any part
thereof ....
71. The plaintiffs in Special District argued that this provision was applicable, but
the court rejected the argument because the formal "determination" to which the statute
refers had not been made. 408 S.W.2d at 64. The court's response seems unduly tech-
nical. The pupils involved were obviously "incapacitated" to some degree, since they
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might also attend one school for the required six hours, then transfer
to a public school to receive auxiliary services. 72  Finally, the legisla-
ture could amend the statute to permit a child to attend one or more
accredited schools for at least six hours each school day.
If any of these proposals were adopted, the supreme court would
undoubtedly then rule on the constitutionality of dual enrollment.73  A
fair reading of the Missouri constitution supports such a scheme. First,
every child has a right to attend a public school;7 4 a decision also to at-
tend private schools should not forfeit that right. Second, parochial
schools and organized religion do not benefit, either directly or indirectly,
from such services. 15 Nor should article LX, section 5, invalidate dual
enrollment of handicapped children;76 the children are part of the pub-
lic school student body when receiving services at the public school.
Finally, dual enrollment would not violate article IX, section 8,77 which
provides spending public funds in aid of a sectarian purpose. The
were receiving speech therapy. Had such a "determination" been made, "the constitu-
tional validity of the practice could be subjected to judicial scrutiny." Id.
72. The Missouri Attorney General has ruled that this is a legitimate application
of the statute and Special District. See Op. Mo. ATr'Y GEN. No. 144 (Nov. 26, 1971).
73. See Op. Mo. AW'y GEN. No. 133 (Oct. 28, 1971), which held that students
not within the ages covered by the compulsory attendance law could attend public voca-
tional schools part of the school day and nonpublic (parochial) schools for the re-
mainder of the school day.
First, the Attorney General stated that dual enrollment would not violate Mo. CoNsT.
art. IX, § 5, see note 15 supra, because "public funds were spent exclusively for the sup-
port and maintenance of a public vocational school." Op. Mo. Arr'Y GEN. No. 133
at 15 (Oct. 28, 1971). Second, the Attorney General stated that the practice would not
violate either Mo. CONST. art. I, § 7, see note 13 supra, or art. IX, § 8, see note 17
supra, because any aid to parochial schools through the practice was incidental. The
United States Constitution does not prohibit incidental aid to parochial schools, and the
Missouri constitution, while more explicit, does not prohibit all public appropriations
that might incidentally benefit parochial schools. Op. Mo. ATr'y GEN. No. 133 at 17
(Oct. 28, 1971).
In Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101-02 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111
(1975), the Missouri supreme court held that the provisions in the Missouri constitution
prohibiting aid to parochial schools are more restrictive than the first amendment.
74. See Mo. CoNST. art. IX, § 1(a); Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W.
765 (1891); State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson, 221 Mo. App. 9, 297 S.W. 419 (1927).
75. One could argue that parochial schools are "aided" because they are relieved of
costs that would be incurred if they provided such services to children. This "aid" to
parochial schools is so incidental, however, that it should survive constitutional scrutiny.
See Note, Shared Time: Indirect Aid to Parochial Schools, 65 MicH. L. REv. 1224, 1229
(1967).
76. See note 15 supra.
77. See note 17 supra. See also Op. Mo. Ar'y QEN. No. 133 (Oct. 28, 1971).
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legislature has declared a public policy to provide all handicapped chil-
dren with such special services as will enable them to maximize their
capabilities.7" Permitting dual enrollment would advance this purely
secular interest, provided only that handicapped children normally
attending public schools had access to the same services. The state
would then provide secular services to all handicapped children.
Should the state also desire to provide services to nonhandicapped chil-
dren, the dual enrollment scheme would apparently permit it, provided
only that the services bore some relationship to a valid public interest
and were offered equally to all.
The most recent Missouri case considering state aid to parochial
education is Paster v. Tussey.79 In Paster, the court invalidated a stat-
ute authorizing textbook loans to any school pupil or teacher "without
[regard to] the school attended.""0 The statute allowed use of the inci-
dental funds to buy textbooks for public school pupils,-' but required
textbooks for nonpublic school students and teachers to be financed
from the state's "free textbook fund."82  The source of the "free
textbook fund" was a Missouri tax on foreign insurance compa-
nies. : The statute expressly prohibited use of any of the article IX,
section 5, public school fund for the purchase of textbooks and forbade
the loan of textbooks for use "in any form of religious instruction or
worship."
The trial court held that the textbook loans to parochial school
teachers violated article I, sections 6 and 7, of the Missouri constitu-
tion" ' by providing direct assistance to teachers of religion. This find-
ing was not seriously challenged on appeal and was summarily affirmed
by the supreme court.15 The trial court upheld, however, the textbook
loans to students. Plaintiffs appealed this finding to the Missouri
supreme court.
Respondents advanced two major arguments in support of textbook
loans to students. First, respondents asserted that article IX, section
5, was inapplicable because the supporting funds were derived, not
78. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.670 (Supp. 1975).
79. 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975).
80. Mo. REv. STAT. § 170.051 (Supp. 1973).
81. Id. See note 52 supra.
82. Mo. REV. STAT. § 170.051.7 (Supp. 1973).
83. 512 S.W.2d at 99. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 148.340 (1969).
84. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
85. 512 S.W.2d at 104.
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from the "public school fund," but from a tax on foreign insurance com-
panies. Consequently, these tax proceeds could be spent for purposes
other than establishing or maintaining public schools. 81 The dispute
between the parties thus centered on the definition of "public school
fund, '87 an issue McVey should have settled. The Paster court again
avoided the issue and refused to decide the applicability of article IX,
section 5, to the free textbook fund.""
The bulk of the court's opinion dealt with the "child benefit theory,"
respondents' second major argument for textbook loans. This theory
asserts that loans made directly to children, rather than to parochial
schools, do not constitute aid to, or support of, religious institutions.
"The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge."8' 0 The United
States Supreme Court has sustained a similar textbook loan program
on precisely this reasoning.90
86. Id. at 102.
87. Id. at 102-03.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
90. Id. The Supreme Court first indicated that benefits provided directly to pupils
would survive constitutional scrutiny in Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281
U.S. 370 (1930). Because the first amendment had not been made applicable to the
states, the Court held only that secular textbook loans to pupils of both public and paro-
chial schools neither constituted "a taking of private property for a private purpose" nor
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. Id. at 374. Quoting from the state court decision that it affirmed, the Court
stated:
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school
books for the use of the school children of the state, free of cost to them. It
was for their benefit and the resulting benefit to the state that the appropria-
tions were made. True, these children attend some school, public or private,
the latter, sectarian or non-sectarian, and that the books are to be furnished
them for their use, free of cost, whichever they attend. The schools, however,
are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations. They obtain nothing from
them, nor are they relieved of a single obligation, because of them. The school
children and the state alone are the beneficiaries.
Id. at 374-75, quoting Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 1020, 123
So. 655, 660-61 (1929).
In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court held that the child bene-
fit theory is also valid under the first amendment. Approving public financing of bus
transportation for parochial school pupils, the Court stated:
The State contributes no money to the [parochial] schools. It does not sup-
port them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general pro-
gram to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools.
Id. at 18. See also note 43 supra.
In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court indicated that application
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The Missouri supreme court, however, refused to apply the child
benefit theory in the same fashion as the United States Supreme Court.
Assuming without deciding that the Missouri constitution would recog-
nize the child benefit theory,91 the court thought it necessary to deter-
mine if the benefit to the child itself aided a sectarian purpose. Since
the recipients of the textbook loans attending parochial schools unques-
tionably intended to use the books in those schools, the court held the
recipients had a sectarian purpose--education in religious schools-
advanced by the state aid.92 Consequently, the court found the loans
to be state expenditures in aid of a sectarian purpose in violation of
article IX, section 8. 9'
The opinion rests on two necessary premises. The first is the court's
conclusion that it
is readily apparent that the provisions of the Missouri Constitution
declaring there shall be separation of church and state are not only more
explicit but more restrictive than the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution.9
This conclusion is necessary because the United States Supreme Court
in Board of Education v. Allen9  explicitly upheld a virtually identical
textbook loan program. 90  The Missouri supreme court's hint97 that a
later decision in Norwood v. Harrison9" limited this rule is incorrect. In
Norwood, the Court invalidated a textbook loan program to students
at private, racially segregated schools. The Court reasoned that the
of the child benefit theory under the first amendment is not restricted to health, safety,
and welfare measures. Sustaining a New York statutory program for free loans of secu-
lar textbooks to students in all schools, the Court asserted:
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general pro-
gram to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request
of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus
no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit
is to parents and children, not to schools. Perhaps free books make it more
likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was true
of the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone demonstrate an un-
constitutional degree of support for a religious institution.
Id. at 243-44 (footnote omitted).
91. 512 S.W.2d at 104.
92. Id. at 104-05.
93. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
94. Id. at 101-02.
95. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
96. Id.
97. 512 S.W.2d at 103.
98. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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loans inevitably benefited the private schools by providing part of the
inescapable costs of education. Thus, the state was promoting racial
segregation in education through indirect means."
Allen and Norwood are entirely compatible since the latter relied on
and reaffirmed the former. 100 The end in Allen, aiding all school chil-
dren through provision of free textbooks, was constitutional, and the
means, a nondiscriminatory loan program, passed the Schempp test of
a "secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion."'' 1 The end in Norwood was the preservation of
racial segregation, a constitutionally impermissible goal. A constitu-
tional means will not save an invalid end. 10 2 Moreover, incidental
benefits to religious organizations do not necessarily render the pro-
gram unconstitutional. 103 Since courts more closely scrutinize cases
involving race, even indirect state action in support of racial discrimina-
tion is constitutionally suspect.'0 4 The Missouri supreme court ulti-
mately agreed that the United States Constitution does not prohibit a
textbook loan program: "[D]isposition of the instant case is not
controlled by federal law .. . . We return to Missouri law to resolve
the issues presented ... 05
Thus, a necessary element in the court's reasoning was its conclusion
that the Missouri constitution is more restrictive in church-state rela-
tions than the first amendment. The cases cited in the opinion do not
support this proposition. The court quoted at length from both Harst
v. Hoegen'0 6 and Berghorn v. Reorganized School District Number
8,107 emphasizing the language in Harfst that asserted an absolute
separation of church and state in educational matters. 08 The language
in both opinions is dicta. In each case a local school district incorpo-
rated a church school into the public system without eliminating the
religious training. Such actions plainly violate the first amendment as
well as the Missouri constitution. Despite the broad language in
99. 413 U.S. at 464.
100. 512 S.W.2d at 106 (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
101. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
102. 512 S.W.2d at 106 (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 108.
104. 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1111, 1115 & n.14.
105. 512 S.W.2d at 104.
106. 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942) (en bane).
107. 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953). See note 28 supra.
108. 349 Mo. at 817, 163 S.W.2d at 614.
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Harist, the holdings of these cases do not establish that the Missouri
rule is more stringent than the federal rule.
The Paster court next cited McVey for the proposition that transport-
ing students to parochial schools with public school funds is unconstitu-
tional.' "' Article IX, section 5, on its face flatly prohibits aid to
parochial schools and students from the public school fund. Although
this section is more restrictive than the first amendment, it is limited
to the "public school fund" and does not support the proposition that
all public spending in Missouri is subject to stricter limitations. The
textbook loans in Paster were funded through a tax on foreign insur-
ance companies. Unless the court defines "public school fund" to
include all public spending for educational purposes, McVey does not
impose stricter limits than the first amendment on public spending not
derived from the public school fund.
The Paster court also cited Special District as reaffirming McVey,
albeit on different facts."' In light of Meek v. Pittenger,"' however,
Special District does not impose stricter constitutional limitations on the
Missouri legislature than does the first amendment. Auxiliary services
in the parochial schools, held unconstitutional in Special District, also
violate the first amendment."' Provision of such services at the public
school, a solution approved in Meek,1 3 was rejected in Special District
on statutory, not constitutional grounds." 4
The court's final authority was McDonough v. Aylivard" 5 in which
the Missouri supreme court held that the state was not compelled to
provide property tax credits to parents of children enrolled in parochial
schools. Since the United States Supreme Court had previously held
that income tax credits to such persons violated the first amendment,11
McDonough hardly supports the proposition that the Missouri constitu-
tion is stricter than the first amendment. Despite broad language,
then, the cases do not support the argument that the Missouri constitu-
109. 512 S.W.2d at 101.
110. Id.
111. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
112. Id. at 372.
113. Id. at 368 n.17.
114, Special Dist. for the Educ. & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408
S.W.2d 60, 63-64 (Mo. 1966).
115. 500 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Mo. 1973).
116. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793-
94 (1973).
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tion imposes more stringent church-state separation requirements than
the first amendment.
The second principle underlying the decision was the court's version
of the child benefit theory. The court evidently believed that article
IX, section 8, prohibiting any public expenditures "in aid of any
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose" or to "help to support or
to sustain any private or public school. . . controlled by any religious
creed, church or denomination," required a more thorough analysis of
the child benefit theory than other courts had provided. Because many
state constitutions contain similar language, several state supreme
courts have considered the child benefit theory in the context of lan-
guage at least as restrictive as that of the Missouri constitution. Since
Paster was a case of first impression, the Missouri supreme court
should have carefully examined these cases for insights about the child-
benefit theory.
Several courts have rejected the child benefit theory as inconsistent
with state constitutional limitations on church-state relations. 11 7  Such
courts have relied upon three different rationales to reach this result.
The first rationale asserts that aid to children attending parochial
schools is inconsistent with the intent of the state constitution. Spears
v. Honda," s8 which overturned a state program of transportation assist-
ance to parochial students, exemplifies this approach. In Honda; the
Hawaii supreme court examined the debates on the Hawaii constitu-
tion which prohibits public spending '"or the support or benefit of any
sectarian or private educational institution." The legislative history of
the section disclosed that the delegates had specifically discussed the
transportation program under attack, concluded that the section dis-
allowed it, and rejected a proposed amendment.119
117. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Milbeim v. Moffat
Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710, 717 (1923); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233
(1920); State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 6 W.W. Harr. 181, 172 A. 835 (Del. 1934);
Spears v. Honda, 51 Hawaii 1, 449 P.2d 130 (1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390,
488 P.2d 860 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Judd v. ,Board of Educ., 278
N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002
(1941); School Dist. v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956); Visser v. Nooksack
Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); Mitchell v. Consolidated
School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943); State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet,
180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923).
118. 51 Hawaii 1, 449 P.2d 130 (1968).
119. Id. at 8-12, 449 P.2d at 135-37. See also Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192
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Epeldi v. Engelking'20 adopted a variant approach to determining
constitutional intent. In Epeldi, the Idaho supreme court construed
the meaning of article 9, section 5, of the Idaho constitution, which is
virtually identical to the Missouri section considered in Paster.2' In
overruling a state transportation program, the court rejected the child
benefit theory on the following grounds:
By the phraseology and diction of this provision it is our conclusion that
the framers of our constitution intended to more positively enunciate the
separation between church and state than did the framers of the United
States Constitution. Had that not been their intention there would have
been no need for this particular provision ....
• . . The requirements of this constitutional provision thus eliminate
. . . the child benefit theory.' 22
Had the Missouri supreme court considered these cases in conjunc-
tion with the debates at the Missouri constitutional convention in 1875,
it would have produced a more defensible decision.
The Missouri supreme court has not relied on constitutional history
to interpret the church-state relations provisions of the Missouri con-
stitution.1"3 The intent of the framers of article IX, section 8, is
obscure. The section originated as an amendment to the Missouri
constitution, approved in 1870 by a margin of 200,000 votes, 124 and
was copied verbatim from the 1875 constitution. 125  At the 1875 con-
stitutional convention, discussion of the section was limited almost
exclusively to whether the word "person" should be retained between
"institution of learning controlled by any" and "religion, creed, church
or sectarian denomination whatever . . . ." The word "person"
120. 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
121. Compare Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 8, with IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 5:
Neither the legislature nor any county, city, town, township, school district,
or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from
any public fund or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or sec-
tarian or religious society, or for any sectarian or religious purpose, or to help
support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university or other
literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church, sectarian or religious
denomination whatsoever; nor shall any grant or donation of land, money or
other personal property ever be made by the state, or any such public corpora-
tion, to any church or for any sectarian or religious purpose.
122. 94 Idaho at 395-96, 488 P.2d at 865-66.
123. Tockman, supra note 43, at 474 n.55.
124. See IX DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
328-29 (G. Loeb & F. Shoemaker ed. 1942).
125. Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Missouri 1943-44, Mar. 10, 1944,
at 9.
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eventually-was deleted; the word "religion" was changed to "religious"
and the comma before "creed" was omitted. There was no discussion
of the meaning of aid for a "sectarian purpose. "126
The 1943-44 convention did discuss the reasons for including both
article I, section 7, banning public aid to religion in any form, and
article IX, section 8, banning aid to any church-sponsored school. The
apparent purpose was to reaffirm in most explicit terms the constitu-
tional prohibition on aid to religious education. 127 The duplicative lan-
guage does not, however, establish a more stringent Missouri constitu-
tional test of what constitutes aid than does the first amendment, nor
does it resolve the question whether aiding parochial school students
was intended to constitute aid to the schools. Any attempt to infer an
intent to reject the child benefit theory from the language or history
of the Missouri constitution is thus likely to be futile.
A second rationale commonly employed to reject the child benefit
theory is that state aid to parochial students also benefits the schools,
albeit indirectly.128  Typical of the cases adopting this approach is
Matthews v. Quinton, 21 a 1961 Alaska decision outlawing state
transportation aid to parochial school students. The court rejected a
strong argument built on the debates at the constitutional convention 30
and concluded that "the furnishing of such transportation at public
expense constitutes a direct benefit to the school."' The court relied
on Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson: transportation, he thought,
was as critical to the effective operation of schools as tuition, teachers'
salaries, and buildings. The legislature could not
126. See IX DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, supra
note 124, at 328-45.
127. See Tockman, supra note 43, at 472-73 n.52. Tockman asserts that the duplica-
tive language was intended to clarify the rule of article IX, section 5, that all public
funds for any educational purpose must be limited to the free public schools. Id. at 472-
74. While not wholly unreasonable, this interpretation is implausible. Had the framers
of the Missouri constitution intended such a rule, they had only to extend the public
use requirement to all public funds for educational purposes, rather than limiting it to
the "public school fund."
128. Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alas. 1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S.
517 (1962); Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972); Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550
(1974); Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
129. 362 P.2d 932 (Alas. 1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962).
130. Id. at 943-44.
131. Id. at 941.
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select so indispensable an item from the composite of total costs, and
characterize it as not aiding, contributing to, promoting or sustaining the
propagation of beliefs which it is the very end of all to bring about.' 32
Other courts have applied this rationale to reject textbook loans to
parochial school students."'
In Paster, the Missouri supreme court adopted a peculiar version of
this rationale. The court recognized that the primary beneficiaries of
the aid would be the children receiving it, but these children would
employ the aid to advance a sectarian purpose-obtaining a religious
education. Thus, the state, by assisting individual recipients who
believe in a religion, would make easier the practice of that religion.
According to Paster, this result is unconstitutional aid to a sectarian
purpose.'
A third, closely related reason for rejecting the child benefit theory
is that every expenditure on behalf of a religious organization benefits
believers; consequently, accepting the child benefit theory would
impose no restraint whatever on state aid to religion.133 Dickman v.
School District No. 62C13 6 is illustrative of these cases. Dickman held
a textbook loan statute unconstitutional under article I, section 5, of the
Oregon constitution which prohibits the use of public funds "for the
benefit of any religeous [sic] or theological institution."' 37  The court
reasoned:
The difficulty with this theory is, however, that unless it is qualified
in some way it can be used to justify the expenditure of public funds
for every educational purpose, because all educational aids are of benefit
to the pupil. 1"
Both the second and third rationales for rejecting the child benefit
theory, especially as applied in Paster, prove too much. If these ration-
ales are correct, the state may supply no service whatsoever to any
religious institution since any services would benefit, however indi-
132. Id., quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 48 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
133. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111
(1975). Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974).
134. 512 S.W.2d at 104-05.
135. Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Gurney v. Fer-
guson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1942); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 232
Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961).
136. 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961).
137. Id. at 246, 366 P.2d at 537.
138. Id. at 250, 366 P.2d at 539-40.
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rectly, the practice of religion. 1 9 If the Paster rule is good law, the
state cannot aid in any way any individual who believes in a religion
since such aid could assist him in fulfilling his religious beliefs. The New
York Court of Appeals recognized this anomaly in overruling Judd v.
Board of Education40 which had been characterized as the "leading
case rejecting the child benefit theory:"141
Certainly, not every State action which might entail some ultimate bene-
fit to parochial schools is proscribed. . . . [A literal interpretation of
the Blaine Amendment] would impede every form of legislation, the
benefits of which, in some remote way, might inure to parochial
schools.' 42
If Paster is correct, parochial school students cannot use public libraries
for class assignments because this assists their efforts to acquire a
religious education. Police and fire protection for parochial schools is
constitutionally impermissible because it assists the practice of religion.
Public buslines may not transport students to parochial schools nor
worshippers to their churches or temples because such state action
assists their efforts to fulfill their religious beliefs.
The more thoughtful decisions have recognized this inherent tension
between unconstitutional support of religion and arbitrary denial of
public services. 43 Those courts adopting a child benefit theory have
developed the qualifying tests recommended by Dickman to ensure that
any support for sectarian purposes remains incidental to servicing the
needs of people who believe in the particular religion. The most
139. See Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 665-67, 167 P.2d 256, 262-63
(1946).
140. 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
141. Dickman v. School Dist. No. 620, 232 Ore. 238, 251, 366 P.2d 533, 540
(1961).
142. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 115-16, 228 N.E.2d 791, 794, 281
N.Y.S.2d 799, 803-04 (1967), aff'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
143. See Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 663, 167 P.2d 256, 260 (1946)
(transportation); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 443-44, 191 S.W.2d 930, 934-35
(1945) (transportation); Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 1020,
123 So. 655, 660 (1929), aff'd sub nom., Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281
U.S. 370 (1930) (textbooks); Adams v. County Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 555, 26 A.2d
377, 379 (1942) (transportation); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 319, 199 A.
628, 631 (1938) (transportation); Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating & Pur-
chasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 464, 200 So. 706, 712 (1941); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
133 N.J.L. 350, 354, 44 A.2d 333, 336 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945), aff'd, 330 U.S. 1 (1930),
rev'g 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (transportation). See also Cushman,
Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. Rav.
333, 347-51 (1950); La None, supra note 50; Tockman, supra note 43, at 484-91 n.91.
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common test is the legislative purpose in passing the statute. The
reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in Allen v. Board of Edu-
cation1" is of particular interest because article XI, section 3, of the
New York constitution imposes more stringent limitations than the
Missouri constitution:
Neither the State nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or
credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance ...of any school .. .
wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught.1
45
Notwithstanding the ban on indirect aid to religious institutions, the
court found in a textbook loan program a legislative purpose merely
to benefit children:
Since there is no intention to assist parochial schools as such, any benefit
acci uing to those schools is a collateral effect of the statute, and, there-
fore, cannot be properly classified as the giving of aid directly or in-
directly.1 4G
The Louisiana supreme court, construing a constitutional provision
banning public support of sectarian schools, employed a similar analysis
to reach a similar conclusion.
The Missouri supreme court ignored the plain purpose of the text-
book statute challenged in Paster. The court evidently assumed with-
out any evidence that the state legislature had some "nefarious pur-
pose"1 48 to aid religion rather than recipients of the loans. Moreover,
the court refused to consider whether textbook loans would, in fact,
encourage more parents to send their children to parochial schools.
Absent such effect the statute would not benefit religious organiza-
tions at all, but would merely reduce the financial hardship on believers
in a particular religion.
A second test of the legitimate application of the child benefit theory
144. 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), aff'd on other
grounds, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
145. N.Y. CoNsr. art. XI, § 3.
146. 20 N.Y.2d at 116, 228 N.E.2d at 794, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
147. Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 1017-20, 123 So. 655,
660 (1929), aff'd sub nom., Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930). See also Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 190
Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
148. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 116, 228 N.E.2d 791, 794, 281
N.Y.S,2d 799, 804 (1967), aff'd on other grounds, 392-U.S..236 (1968).
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focuses on the capacity in which the religious institution benefits from
the state program. Dickman employed such a standard, albeit in strik-
ing down a textbook loan program.149  This test recognizes that the
state cannot assist the religious functions of religious institutions, but
may constitutionally provide them services in their secular capacity.
Thus, police and fire services are legitimate because they protect
private property that happens to belong to churches. Public buslines
may transport children to parochial schools because the service benefits
directly children who happen to belong to a particular religion. Under
this test the issue is whether textbook loans assist a religious or secular
function. For example, so long as a text relates only to secular sub-
jects, it does not aid religious instruction. The parochial education
process may in general inculcate religious values, but providing secular
texts aids such teaching no more than providing fire services.Y0  A
chemistry text is not a catechism. Regrettably, the Paster court ignored
such a functional analysis of the textbook program.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has developed a three-part
test of the legitimacy of state aid to religious institutions. Such aid must
have a secular purpose, a primary effect that does not advance the
religious cause, and must not involve excessive entanglement of church
and state.' 5' Because the Missouri constitution does not necessarily
impose more stringent limitations than the first amendment,5 2 the
Paster court could have adopted the child benefit theory, using the
Court's three-part test to avert excessive state involvement in parochial
schools. Such an analysis would have sustained the textbook loan pro-
149. Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 232 Ore. 238, 256-57, 366 P.2d 533, 543
(1961), citing Cushman, supra note 143, at 348.
150. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 116, 228 N.E.2d 791, 794, 281
N.Y.S.2d 799, 894 (1967), af!'d on other grounds, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Professor
Freund distinguishes the two situations on the ground that when the state loans text-
books to parochial school pupils for use in a parochial school, the parochial school
chooses the books, its teachers interpret the books, and the books are used in a religious
atmosphere, whereas public libraries are "managed by public authorities not delegating
responsibility for selection of books or personnel or symbolic decor to any religious
group." Freund, supra note 6, at 1683. Those distinctions are unpersuasive. Although
parochial schools may select the books they wish to use, their choice of books generally
is restricted to a list prepared by the state board of education or to those used in public
schools. Furthermore, although library books are stored in and borrowed from public
libraries, those books may be taken to parochial schools and read and studied in a
religious atmosphere.
151. See note 6 supra.
152. See notes 106-16 supra and accompanying text.
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vision.' 53 The failure to employ it suggests that the Missouri supreme
court is less concerned with constitutional mandates than with invalidat-
ing any state program that provides any aid, directly or indirectly, to
parochial schools.
Paster v. Tussey is most significant as an illustration of the Missouri
supreme court's fundamental attitude toward aid to parochial educa-
tion. In this case, the court clearly could have upheld the statute as
a constitutional use of legislative power. In contrast to the incorporation
of parochial schools into a public school system, considered in Harfst,
nondiscriminatory lending of secular textbooks to all pupils creates
neither obvious aid to religion nor excessive state involvement with the
church. In contrast to McVey and the first part of Special District,
none of the public school fund was used for purposes other than
supporting public schools. Nor could the court, as it did in the second
part of Special District, simply construe a statute to prohibit certain aid.
The free textbook statute was carefully drafted to avoid technical defi-
ciencies that might invalidate it."' Finally, the court could not follow
analogous United States Supreme Court precedent. The court's
invalidation of the textbook loans, on the broadest possible grounds,
clearly indicates that the court will not tolerate any expenditure of state
funds that facilitates the continued existence of parochial schools.
So absolute a wall of separation between church and state is not re-
quired by either the explicit language of the Missouri constitution or a
fair interpretation of such language. Since the rule is judicially construc-
153. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1967), affd, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
154. In enacting § 170.051, the General Assembly was aware of the Missouri cases
in which the supreme court invalidated other types of aid. To avoid the possibility of
the court interpreting the statute to apply only to public school pupils, "school" was
defined as any school, public or nonpublic, in which the requirements of the compulsory
attendance law may be fulfilled. Id. at 1. The textbooks were to be loaned to all
pupils without discrimination. Id. at 2. Title to, control, and administration of the
use of the textbooks was to remain in the public school board, thus preventing any ob-
jection that the parochial schools were given outright grants of materials. Id. at 4.
The state board of education had sole control over what books could be loaned, thus
preventing parochial schools from exercising discretion over any state funds. Id. at
6. Finally, the statute explicitly prohibited the expenditure of any of the article IX,
1 5, "public school fund" for the purchase of the textbooks, thus avoiding a violation
of article IX, § 5. Id. at 7. See also Special Dist. for the Educ. & Training of
Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins,
364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1953).
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ted rather than constitutionally compelled, it is amenable to change
through subsequent judicial examination as well as by constitutional
amendment. A reevaluation of Paster in future decisions of the Mis-
souri supreme coure might produce a more defensible result.
I1. STATE LAW AND FEDERAL QUESTIONS
The effects of the Missouri supreme court's interpretation of the state
constitution are not limited to state law. Disposition of federal funds
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Acte0 5 are critically
155. The requirement that local public authorities provide comparable services to pri-
vate and public schools posed a serious dilemma under the original Title I legislation.
As construed in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), Title I imposed potentially
contradictory requirements on states like Missouri with a strict requirement of separation
of church and state. On the one hand, Title I insisted on services to educationally de-
prived children in parochial schools "comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for
participation to those provided for public school children with needs of equally high pri-
ority." United States Office of Education, Program Guide No. 44 4.5 (1968), quoted
in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 407 (1974), On the other hand, the legislative his-
tory made it clear that state statutory and constitutional limitations applied in this feder-
ally funded program. Under Paster it is improbable that local authorities could spend
any funds to aid parochial school students; under Special District it is unquestionable that
on-premises teaching services, which were the most effective means of delivering Title I
services, were impermissible. See Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 F.2d 1338, 1346 (8th Cir.
1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 402 (1974). The state thus faced the unpleasant choice of violat-
ing its constitution, terminating the most effective method of providing services to public
school students, or withdrawing from the program. See 417 U.S. at 423-26.
Recognizing the legal inability of certain states to provide comparable services to edu-
cationally deprived parochial school students, Congress amended Title I in 1974. Under
the 1974 amendments, if a state or local agency is prohibited by state law from, or sim-
ply fails to provide comparable services to parochial school pupils, the federal Commis-
sioner of Education must "bypass" the local agency to provide services to these pupils
by other means. 20 U.S.C. § 241e-l(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1974); see also H.R. Rur. No.
93-805, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). The cost of services provided to parochial
school pupils must be deducted from the allocations otherwise available to local agencies.
20 U.S.C. § 241e-1(b) (3) (Supp. IV 1974).
These amendments might influence the Missouri supreme court to interpret the Mis-
souri constitution to allow Title I services to parochial school students, lest the state re-
ceive a smaller Title I allotment. See Comment, The Elementary and Secondary Educa.
tion Act-The Implications of the Trust-Fund Theory for Church-State Questions
Raised by Title 1, 65 MicH. L. Rnv. 1184, 1203 (1967). In light of Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975), such services would have to be provided on public, not private
premises. The second consequence of the amendments is that they will expedite a first
amendment challenge to Title I in the federal courts by removing the major impact of
state constitutional provisions on aid to parochial schools. See generally Amdursky,
The First Amendment and Federal Aid to Church-Related Schools, 17 SmRAcusE L. REV.
609 (1966); Drinan, Reflections on the Implications of Title I of the Elementary and
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influenced by state law. Moreover, the prohibition of any aid to chil-
dren attending parochial schools raises federal constitutional questions.
So absolute a wall between church and state may unconstitutionally
infringe upon the free exercise of religion and may violate the four-
teenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. Although federal
courts have not yet accepted either argument, neither have they been
confronted with the extremely severe rule enunciated in Paster. Argu-
ably, therefore, Missouri violates the United States Constitution in
enforcing its state constitutional limitation.
Federal courts have twice been asked to hold that Missouri's denial
of aid to parochial education violates the Federal Constitution. In
Brusca v. Missouri ex rel. State Board of Education,'-6 a federal district
court held that Missouri's policy of funding public schools while pro-
hibiting aid to parochial schools violates neither the free exercise clause
of the first amendmentl5 nor the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.'r, Although the establishment clause might allow
some state aid to parochial schools, the free exercise clause did not
require the state to "assist a parent in educating his child religiously
with the use of tax-raised money."' 59  The court rejected an analogy
to Sherbert v. Verner,' which had held unconstitutional a state regula-
tion conditioning unemployment compensation upon availability for
work on Saturdays, thereby violating the basic tenets of petitioner's-
religion. In Brusca, by contrast, plaintiffs had not contended "that
attendance at public schools is contrary to the basic precepts or tenets
of their religion." a tl Also, the court did not consider a ban on aid to
parochial schools to be a violation of equal protection. When public
schools are freely available to all, without regard to religious belief, a
parent's voluntary decision to send his children to parochial schools "does
not deprive him of anything by State action."'01 2 Consequently, the state
need not assist him financially. 1
63
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 15 CATH. LAW. 179 (1969); La Noue, Church-State
Problems in New Jersey: The Implementation of Title I (ESEA) in Sixty Cities, 22
RUTGERS L. REV. 219 (1968).
156, 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1050 (1972).
157. See note 6 supra.
158. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "No state shall ... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
159. 332 F. Supp. at279.
160. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
161. 332 F. Supp. at 279. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
162. 332 F. Supp. at 279.
163. Id.
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In Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann,0 4 another federal court addressed a
narrower question-the validity of free transportation for public, but
not parochial, pupils-but analyzed more extensively the federal con-
stitutional issues.16 In addition to arguing that the state policy penal-
ized the free exercise of religion and denied equal protection,0 6 plain-
tiffs argued that denial of equal transportation benefits to pupils and
supporters of parochial schools violated the fourteenth amendment due
process clause.'67  The court rejected each argument and held that the
United States Constitution does not require Missouri to provide trans-
portation for parochial school pupils on the same basis as public school
pupils.' 68
The court first determined that the "child benefit" theory, which
allows states to provide bus transportation for parochial school pupils,"'
does not compel them to do so.' 70  Plaintiffs raised two equal protec-
tion arguments: first, denial of free transportation to parochial school
pupils was "an arbitrary and unreasonable classification;' 171 second,
the classification was suspect because it infringed upon "plaintiffs'
fundamental right" to "freely exercise their religion."'1 72  The court
rejected the second claim decisively: "it cannot be said that one has a
federally protected constitutional right to a parochial school educa-
tion.' 173  Consequently, the classification should be sustained if it
164. 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), affd mem., 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
165. Id. at 377. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 163.061; 163.161; 165.011; 167.231; 167.251
(1969).
166. 364 F. Supp. at 377-78.
167. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. )IV, § 1, provides: "No state shall . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ....
168. 364 F. Supp. at 387.
169. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
170. 364 F. Supp. at 381. Dicta in Everson supports the Luetkemeyer court's con-
clusion: "we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only
to children attending public schools ... " 330 U.S. at 16.
171. 364 F. Supp. at 381.
172. Id. at 382.
173. Id. The court cited San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), for the proposition that public education is not a federally protected con-
stitutional right, and declared that if public education is not constitutionally guaranteed,
neither is parochial education. The court's statement is overbroad; one does have a con-
stitutional right to parochial education, provided he is willing to pay for it. See Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1928). The court should have said, and probably
meant to say, that one does not have a constitutional right to a publicly subsidized
parochial school education.
Plaintiffs argued that they had a constitutional right to attend a parochial school, cit-
ing Pierce, and that "'any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of
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promotes a "valid State objective."' 74  The court found that Mis-
souri's policy of "maintaining a very high wall between church and
state" was a "legitimate State purpose." Denying transportation bene-
fits to parochial school pupils was consistent with and promoted that
purpose.
17
Plaintiffs' due process argument asserted that the state required them
to forego their religious beliefs in order to receive transportation to
their schools. 176  This argument was based on Sherbert v. Verner 77
in which the Supreme Court overturned a South Carolina rule condi-
tioning unemployment compensation on petitioner's willingness to work
on Saturdays, a violation of her fundamental religious beliefs.178 The
Court held that such conditions were tantamount to a penalty for reli-
gious beliefs, justifiable only by a "compelling state interest."'179
[a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest, is unconsitutional.'" 364 F. Supp. at 382, quoting Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
174. 364 F. Supp. at 382. Consistent with the traditional equal protection approach,
the court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that "the classification does not
reasonably promote a valid State objective." Id.
175. Id. at 382-83.
176. Id. at 384.
177. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
178. Id. at 406. The Court used a variety of phrases to describe the appellant's rea-
son for refusing to work on Saturday: "conscientious scruples," id. at 399; "conscien-
tious objection," id. at 403; "precepts of her religion," id. at 404; "cardinal principle of
her religious faith," id. at 406; and "religious convictions," id. at 410. The Court's use
of these phrases may be relevant to consideration of a parent's decision not to send his
children to public schools. While few parents could claim that sending their children
to public schools would violate a "cardinal principle of their religious faith," many more
parents legitimately could claim that the other phrases used by the Court in Sherbert
do describe their reason for not sending their children to public schools.
179. Id. at 406-09.
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permis-
sible limitation," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 [(1945)].
Id. at 406. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state's interest in com-
pulsory secondary education is not sufficient to justify infringement of Amish belief that
it would be contrary to their religion); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(state's interest in having individuals register for military draft is sufficient to justify
criminal penalties for burning one's draft card, even though first amendment rights are
incidentally restricted); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (state's interest in
uniform day of rest justifies Sunday closing law that operates to the economic disadvan-
tage of those persons whose religious beliefs compel them to observe Saturday as a day
of rest).
Washington University Open Scholarship
314 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Luetkemeyer court found Sherbert inapposite for two reasons.
First, the Court had not ruled that every state regulation imposing
financial hardship on believers in particular religions was invalid. 180
Sherbert involved a request for dispensation from a general regula-
tory law, not a request or demand for a public service.181 Second,
the court concluded that
[t]he long established constitutional policy of the State of Missouri,
which insists upon a degree of separation of church and state to probab-
ly a higher degree than that required by the First Amendment, is indeed
a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power . '1. 2
Although the Missouri policy made plaintiffs' exercise of their religion
more expensive, such a result was justified under the due process
clause by Missouri's interest in separation of church and state, "an
'interest of the highest order.' "s183 Accordingly, the court concluded
that
[t]he fact that Missouri has determined to enforce a more strict [sic]
policy of church and state separation than that required by the First
Amendment does not present any substantial federal constitutional ques-
tion. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that there is an area
of activity which falls between the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause in which action by a State will not violate the former
nor inaction, the latter. 84
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court without opinion,8 5 but
with two justices dissenting.' 86
Analysis of these decisions, and of the constitutional power of states
180. 364 F. Supp. at 385.
181. Id. Although the court gave no citation, this distinction is taken from Freund,
supra note 6, at 1688.
182. 364 F. Supp. at 386.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
186. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, believed that denying transporta-
tion to parochial school pupils is a denial of equal protection:
The enforcement of church-state separation could in many instances be a valid
state interest, but after Everson it would be difficult to assert that refusal to
extend busing to parochial school children, without more, furthers a legitimate
state interest in avoiding church-state entanglements. On the contrary, the
"benefits of public welfare legislation"--here a "generalprogram to help par-
ents get their children . . . safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools,".., seem to be denied because certain students are seeking religious
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to deny certain kinds of aid to parochial schools, requires consideration
of two basic assumptions: (1) denial of all aid is a justifiable means
to promote separation of church and state, and (2) a parent's deci-
sion to send his children to parochial schools is purely voluntary. The
constitutional merits of a state's position toward aid to parochial educa-
tion will, in large measure, depend on the validity of these assumptions.
Although the principle of "separation of church and state" is almost
universally acknowledged, it is nearly impossible to ascribe a precise
meaning to the phrase. To some people, the principle means that the
government may not burden, restrict, or interfere with personal reli-
gious beliefs; to others, the principle means that the government may not
promote any religion by spending tax-raised money to aid institutions
that teach or encourage religious beliefs. Not coincidentally, the first
amendment, the constitutional basis for separation of church and state,
includes both meanings. As Chief Justice Burger observed in Walz v.
Tax Commission,'8 7
[t]he Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either
of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." "'
The Chief Justice resolved the apparent inconsistency by perceiving
that the first amendment requires the government to maintain an atti-
tude of "benevolent neutrality" toward religion. 189 Similarly, the first
amendment has been characterized as "prohibiting classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or impose a burden."'a 0
The "benevolent neutrality" suggested by Chief Justice Burger may
have different policy implications when applied to supporters of a
religion or church than to the church itself. For churches, "benevolent
187. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
188. Id. at 668-69.
189. Id. at 669. See also Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) (emphasis added): "A proper respect for both the
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of
'neutrality' toward religion." Everson v. Board of Edue., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947):
IT]he First Amendment . . . requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.
(Emphasis added). See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694-700 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
190. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CM. L. Rlv. 1,
96 (1961).
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neutrality" may require states to avoid any substantial entanglement,
whether fiscal, doctrinal or administrative, in church affairs. For
individuals, however, neutrality requires the state to treat all persons
equally, regardless of religious affiliation. When the state provides
auxiliary educational services such as speech therapy to children,
"benevolent neutrality" prohibits discrimination between students
based on religious affiliation. If access to these services is conditioned
on the child's religious beliefs, two constitutionally proscribed conse-
quences follow. First, the state has created a classification based on
religion, a possible violation of fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion.' 91 Second, by granting benefits only to persons who forego the
exercise of their religious preferences, the state may have interfered
with the free exercise of religion, also a constitutional violation.'92
The Missouri supreme court's interpretation of state constitutional
provisions relating to religion cannot be squared with Chief Justice Bur-
ger's "benevolent neutrality" standard. Both Paster and Special Dis-
trict create religious classifications." 3 Students who attend parochial
schools cannot receive state-supplied auxiliary services or textbooks.
To obtain such services, the students and their parents must forego the
religious portion of their education.9 4
The second basic assumption is that a parent's decision to send his
child to a parochial school is purely voluntary. If basic religious beliefs
require a parent to send his children to a religious school, the denial
of any state aid to parochial education may violate the parents' first
amendment rights.'" 5 These parents have no acceptable alternative to
public schools since their religion forbids a public education. Other par-
ents believe that parochial education will enhance their children's reli-
gious training. Because a parent's choice of where to educate his children
is constitutionally guaranteed, 96 denial of all state aid to parochial
191. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 386-87 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring and
dissenting); cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946).
192. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring and dis-
senting); cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
193. See notes 68-69 and 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 194-95 infra and accompanying text.
195. Brusca v. Missouri ex rel. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D. Mo.
1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 1050 (1972); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
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schools may coerce a religiously-motivated parent into sending his child
to a public school. Denial of all state aid may therefore significantly
interfere with a parent's right to choose a school for his child and with
his right to free exercise of his religion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has declared that cases arising
under the first amendment's religion clauses present "some of the most
perplexing problems to come before the Court."'19 7 The Court has also
stated that cases concerning aid to parochial education "involve an
intertwining of societal and constitutional issues of the greatest impor-
tance.'' 9 In contrast, the Missouri supreme court has not considered
cases on aid to parochial education arising under Missouri law to be
perplexing because it believes that the state constitution unambigu-
ously denies all public aid.'19 Except in Harfst v. Hoegen,200 the court
has paid only superficial attention to the social issues involved. The
court has utterly failed to consider the present and future effects of
denying all aid to parochial education, choosing instead to cast the issue
solely as one of law.20 ' Whether the court should be lauded for prin-
cipled constitutional adjudication or rebuked for narrow-minded dog-
matism depends on personal belief.
Textbook, transportation and auxiliary service aid to parochial school
students is not necessarily proscribed by the Missouri constitution or by
the first amendment. By erecting a barrier of absolute separation
between religious education and public funding,202 the Missouri su-
preme court has failed to adopt the "benevolent neutrality" suggested
by the Chief Justice. -0 3 More importantly, Missouri courts have denied
needed educational and therapeutic aid to those who need it.
197. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973).
198. Id. at 759.
199. See Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111
(1975), discussed in notes 79-154 supra and accompanying text.
200. 349 Mo. 808, 814-15, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (1942) (en bane), discussed in notes
19-35 5upra and accompanying text.
201. 349 Mo. at 817, 163 S.W.2d at 614.
202. Pa;ter v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101-02 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1111 (1975), discussed in notes 79-154 supra and accompanying text.
203. Sec notes 188-89 supra and accompanying text,
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